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Volume I: Technical Assessment Report 
1.0 Authorization and Notification 
The request to conduct an assessment on the Phoenix Mars Mission Robotic Arm (RA) Brush 
Motor Failure was submitted to the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) on August 10, 
2006.
The authority to proceed was approved in an out-of-board action on August 10, 2006.  Mr. John 
McManamen, NESC Discipline Expert (NDE) at Johnson Space Center (JSC), was requested to 
lead the review effort.  The leadership responsibility was subsequently transitioned to Mr. Joe 
Pellicciotti, Mechanical System Chief Engineer at the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) due 
to his expertise in similar systems.  
An outbrief and final report was presented to the NESC Review Board (NRB) on March 8, 2007. 
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4.0 Executive Summary 
The Phoenix Project requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) perform an 
independent peer review of the Robotic Arm (RA) Direct Current (DC) motor brush anomalies 
that originated during the Mars Exploration Rover (MER) Project and recurred during the 
Phoenix Project.  The request was to evaluate the Phoenix Project investigation efforts and 
provide an independent risk assessment.  This includes a recommendation for additional work 
and assessment of the flight worthiness of the RA DC motors. 
The NESC IRT investigation was limited to teleconference and transfer of information 
electronically between the IRT and the Phoenix Project engineers.  The information exchange 
process proved to be acceptable for the level of evaluation requested. 
The RA motors (Figure 4.0-1) are of a single string brush DC type, which were originally built 
for the MER Project.  The motor brush material (copper/graphite/MoS2) was formulated by the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and the brushes were manufactured in Europe by the suppliers 
to Maxon, the motor manufacturer (residing in Switzerland).  The brushes were provided as 
Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE) to Maxon for producing the MER brush motors, 
replacing the stock brush material used for terrestrial applications.  During the MER Project, the 
brush’s sensitivity to external shock was demonstrated during the initial pyro shock qualification 
testing, which resulted in failure of the motor brushes.  This was attributed to component shock 
testing that was subsequently determined to be an over test of the assembly.  The motor design 
was eventually qualified for 2,600 Gs peak shock response spectra (SRS) during the MER 
Project.  Since the pyro shock requirement for the Phoenix Project application was 1,500 Gs 
peak SRS, the motor design was deemed qualified by similarity and no component shock testing 
was performed.  However, two motors were found during the Phoenix Project development to 
have broken brushes from unknown causes. 
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Figure 4.0-1.   Flight Model (FM) and Engineering Model (EM) Phoenix Mission RAs 
The Phoenix Project engineering group performed a detailed investigation into the anomalies that 
resulted in a Failure Cause/Corrective Action Rating of 4 (Unknown Cause, Uncertainty in 
Corrective Action), with a Failure Effect Rating of 3 (Major Degradation or Total Loss of 
Function).  As of this report date, no 5x5 risk assessment was conducted by the project.  These 
motors are critical to the Phoenix mission since a complete failure of a particular motor would 
result in meeting the minimum mission criteria or a loss of mission (LOM).  The most likely 
cause of the brush anomaly was attributed to handling damage.  This conclusion was drawn 
principally from a process of elimination of other potential causes and the fragility of the brushes 
to shock loading.  There was no specific documented incident of a handling problem for the 
failed motors.  However, the Phoenix Project did not have an explicit handling procedure, 
beyond best practices for handling flight hardware, to protect these motors from impact.   
The NESC’s Independent Review Team (IRT) assessment of project risk, using the standard 5x5 
matrix, resulted in rating the risk in two separate areas of concern.  The first is a brush pivot 
Motors
(4 per Arm)
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break with a consequence rating of 5 and a likelihood rating of 1.  The second risk is for 
detection of a brush tip break with a consequence rating of 4 and a likelihood rating of 3.  The 
rationale for these ratings are presented in Section 6.3 and based on the IRT evaluation of the 
motor screening tests and results.
The screening process for motor acceptability that the Phoenix Project implemented included 
detailed “motor health checks” (originally developed during execution of the MER Project).
These checks involved standard static measurements such as motor resistance, insulation 
resistance, and dielectric breakdown as well as detailed examination of the high bandwidth 
current traces during initial operation.  However, post environmental tests did not include the 
electrical “motor health checks” because of difficulties integrating the high resolution electrical 
equipment into the Phoenix Project Electrical Ground Support Equipment (EGSE). Only low 
resolution electrical measurements were performed.  This rationale was deemed acceptable by 
the Phoenix Project because the high bandwidth “motor health checks” were specifically 
developed to detect internal open circuits in otherwise functional motors.  
In addition to these electrical tests, an auditory test was developed for the Phoenix Project.
Broken brushes generate debris in the motor housing.  By manipulating the motors in different 
orientations while energized, the brush debris may move by the force of gravity and can contact 
the rotating armature, resulting in noise that can be audibly detected. 
The investigation resulted in seven Findings, one Observation, and two Recommendation from 
the NESC Independent Review Team (IRT).  The most notable of these is Finding (F-3) and the 
associated recommendation which discusses nondestructive inspection and neutron radiography 
(N-ray) testing.  An N-ray test of the motors could be performed to evaluate the existing 
condition of the flight brushes while intact within the motor.  Preliminary testing suggests that an 
N-ray test could reveal a macroscopic fracture (separation) of the brush material, although it is 
inconclusive that performing this test would reveal a crack in the brush.
Performing an N-ray test on the flight motors would provide a baseline configuration assessment 
where subsequent operations and handling could be controlled in a manner that limits loads on 
the motor.  Having this inspection data post-environmental testing would provide confidence that 
the brushes have not been abusively handled, exposed to excessive shock loading, and/or are on 
the higher strength end (high scatter in brush strength testing) of the material lot, and therefore 
would reduce the risk associated with launch and operational failures (LOM).  However, at this 
point in the project an inspection would require removal of the motors from the RA assembly.  
Once the RA has reached system level testing on the vehicle, removal of the motors for 
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inspection is not recommended due to the potential for damage from the additional transportation 
and handling. 
Based on the investigation and findings contained within this report, the IRT concurs with the 
risk assessment Failure Cause / Corrective Action (FC/CA) by the project, “Failure Effect Rating 
“3”; Major Degradation or Total Loss of Function, Failure Cause/Corrective Action Rating 
Currently “4”; Unknown Cause, Uncertainty in Corrective Action.”
5.0 Assessment Plan 
This investigation establishes the IRT support for Phoenix Mission RA Brush Motor Failure 
within the NESC.  It defines the mission, responsibilities, membership, and conduct of 
operations for this assessment. 
This assessment was initiated out-of-board by the authority of the NESC Deputy Director on 
August 10, 2006.  The objective was to identify the issues associated with the brush DC motors, 
provide recommendations for additional work, and to provide an assessment of the flight 
worthiness of the motors.  The motors in question are on the RA of the vehicle and are mission 
critical. 
An NESC IRT with relevant expertise was formed to perform the assessment.  The IRT includes 
expertise in mechanical systems, electro-mechanical, and materials engineering proficiencies. 
The IRT investigation was limited to teleconference and transfer of information electronically 
between the IRT and the Phoenix Project engineers.  The information exchange process proved 
to be acceptable for the level of evaluation requested. 
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6.0 Problem Description, Proposed Solutions, and Risk Assessment 
6.1 Problem Description 
The anomalies with these motors occur in the commutating brushes.  There are two failure 
modes that have been identified which are a concern for mission success (shown in Figure 6.1-
1).
Figure 6.1-1. Motor Brush Anomalies – Tip Failure (Left) and Pivot Failure (Right) 
For the MER Project, a total of 211 motors of this size were purchased.  These motors are 
permanent magnet brush type DC motors manufactured by Maxon in Switzerland.  The 
composite brushes were manufactured in Europe by suppliers to Maxon, in accordance with a 
JPL-developed formulation and provided to Maxon as GFE.  Of the 211 brush DC motors, 168 
were fully tested and flight-qualified for use on the MER Project. None of these motors showed 
any indication of degraded or broken brushes.
Several motors were used by the MER Project for simulated pyro shock exposure at the 
component level to assess their capability to meet anticipated in service shock loads.  The motors 
failed to pass the specified pyro shock environment.  Tests at different shock levels determined 
that the maximum level the motors could tolerate at the component level was 2,600 Gs peak 
SRS, well below the 4,000 Gs peak SRS requirement.  It was only at the component level shock 
testing that resulted in broken brushes.  No motor brush failures were detected during actual pyro 
shock testing at the assembly level.  The shock environment for all motor locations were 
reassessed and some, but not all, of the applications were acceptable with no additional work.
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“Red-Flag” Problem/Failure Reports (PFR) remained for three of the MER Project applications 
because, while no motors ever failed after exposure to the actual shock from pyrotechnics, the 
margin could not be demonstrated for the three remaining locations.    
Simulated pyro shock testing at the component level routinely results in an overtest situation.
The exact shock environment seen at the component level within the complete assembly is 
difficult to predict, while shock testing at the assembly level provides better fidelity and less 
(more realistic) risk to the hardware.  This was demonstrated at the MER Project where 50 
RE020 motors were integrated, tested, launched, placed on Mars, and operated successfully 
beyond their mission design life.   
Prior to the MER launch, one motor was sent to the Kennedy Space Center (where the test 
equipment was located) for determining the condition of a test motor (component level) exposed 
to simulated pyro shock.  The unit exhibited anomalous current traces, and failed to function 
upon return to JPL.  The motor was found to have a broken brush at disassembly.   
In addition to the 50 RE020 units now on Mars, 17 units were used in the MER Project test bed.
The remaining units were placed in storage under the Flight Hardware Logistics Program 
(FHLP). For the Phoenix Project, 28 of these motors were retrieved from FHLP, including serial 
numbers (S/Ns) 40 and 60 which were found to be defective with broken commutator brushes
Similar to other (26) motors pulled, these two motors were fully tested by the MER Project, but 
were not exposed to a shock environment before they were placed in FHLP.  S/N 40 was one of 
the original four units that were part of the qualification program performed by the MER Project.  
S/N 60 was originally integrated into the MER Project flight spare high-gain-antenna gimbal 
(HGAG).  S/N 60 was then de-integrated from the HGAG and assembled in the electron 
microscope autoradiography (EMRA) wrist.  S/N 60 was replaced by S/N 101 after the motor 
failure was discovered during the Phoenix Project.  No clear failure mechanism has been 
established for these two brush failures.  It was suggested, but cannot be substantiated, that 
adverse handling may have precipitated the breakage.  There appear to have been no special 
handling and storage procedures in place beyond the care normally exercised with flight 
hardware.   Figure 6.1-2 illustrates the flow and processing of S/N 040 and 060. 
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Integration w/ HGAG Gearhead 
Ambient No-Load Functional (Starsys)
Screening and Validation Testing of MER Brush Motors
(Ref Phoenix PFRs 2764 & 4024)
Three Different Formulations 
of Motor Brushes Manufactured 
(For both RE2020 & RE025 Sizes)
Dev Test Motors Integrated 
w/ Different Brush Types
Brush Life Development Testing at JPL 
(Later Upgraded to Qualification) 
Stock & Candidate Brushes 
Ambient, CO2 & GN2; RT & -80°C
Flight Brushes Integrated w/ 
Flight Motors at Maxon
Motor Run-In & Functional Testing 
(Ambient Only)
Brush Proof Test to 2 Newtons in-situ 
(First & Last Motors Manufactured - No Failures) 
100% Visual Inspection in-situ 
(3 of 4 sides of Brushes visible)
Unknown Acceptance Process at Vendors 
No Lot Inspection by JPL
Flight Brush Material Selected;
Brushes Sent to Maxon for Flight Build
Motor FA Test Program
Vacuum Bake-Out +115°C 
FA Random Vibe 
Qual Th/CO2 Functional (No Load) 
(32 Early Units saw P/F Vibe)
PP/Vacuum Bake-Out +115°C 
Qual Random Vibe & Sine Pulse 
Ambient No-Load Functional Pre & Post Vibe 
Life Qual Deleted; See Dev Test Program 
(Ref PFRs Z72347, Z74174)
Motor PQV 
(Ref PFR Z76957)
Motor Pyro Shock 
(Ref PFR Z74236)
Motor/Detent Integration
No-load Ambient Testing
HRCR & Delivery to Users 
Flight Acceptance for 
Mission Environments 
Performed at Next Level
of Integration
DELIVERY TO JPL 
168 REO20 Motors
RE020 S/N 040
RE020 S/N 060
Phoenix RA Motor Qual Life Test #1
(Unit Exhibited Anomalous Current 
Signature Early in -80°C Life Test) 
Reference PFR 2764
RE020 S/N 040 
(Storage in FHLP)
RE020 S/N 060
De-Integration of MER HGAG Gearhead 
Integration w/ Phoenix RA Gearhead 
(Unit Exhibited Excessive No-Load Current) 
Reference PFR 4024
MER PROGRAM
PHOENIX  PROGRAM
MotorQualification Test Program
RE020 S/N 040
RE020 S/N 060 
(Storage in FHLP)
Figure 6.1-2. History of Failed Brush Motors S/N 040 and 060 
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6.2 Proposed Solutions 
A series of screening tests (electrical and auditory) were conducted to evaluate the flight motors 
prior to RA integration.  The acceptance of the motors for the Phoenix Project RA relied 
primarily on the detailed “motor health checks” previously performed during the MER Project.  
These involved the standard static measurements such as motor resistance, insulation resistance, 
and dielectric breakdown as well as detailed examination of the high bandwidth current traces 
during initial operation.  If any of the static measurements of a motor performance were outside 
the normal range, it would have been flagged to receive further scrutiny and, depending on the 
aggregate results, could be rejected for flight.   
The motor current traces were examined for current noise and symmetry between clockwise and 
counter-clockwise rotation.  As shown from measurements on motor S/N 40 containing a brush 
with a broken tip, the initial current is noisy and asymmetrical due to poor conformance of the 
brush contact surface to the commutator.  However, after running the motor for a brief period of 
time, the brush can wear and regain conformity to the commutator contour. Current noise and 
symmetry measurements, likewise, return to nominal levels.  This indicates there can be a lack of 
assurance with only post exposure electrical testing.   The motor operation appears to be healthy 
based on current noise and symmetry characteristics, but its life may be limited because of the 
reduction in the amount of available brush material.   
Although the low resolution electrical tests performed provide some confidence for acceptance 
of the motors for flight, these tests are not definitive for long term operational performance.  In 
an attempt to enhance the evaluation of the motors for flight acceptance, and to screen degraded 
brushes performing acceptably for the short term, an auditory test was developed.  Broken 
brushes can leave debris in the motor housing.  By manipulating the motors in different 
orientations while energized, the brush debris may move by the force of gravity and can contact 
the rotating armature, resulting in a noise that can be audibly detected.   If these sounds are 
perceptible, the motor could be further evaluated and potentially rejected from flight.  The 
success of the auditory test is highly dependent on the presence and size of the particles 
generated, and also assumes the motor has not seen additional operation pulverizing debris prior 
to conducting the auditory test. 
At this time, efforts have been concentrated on verifying that the brush motors within the 
assembled RA are acceptable for flight using the latest techniques available developed to detect 
broken brushes.  On June 9, 2006, prior to starting RA environmental testing, two motors were 
checked in situ using the auditory test technique.  All four motors in the RA were verified using 
the auditory technique on June 27 and 28, 2006, after the RA was tested to proto-flight levels.  
The RA was articulated to position each joint motor in proper orientation relative to gravity to 
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perform the auditory test.  No anomalous auditory signatures were detected.  The electrical 
“motor health checks” were not performed because of difficulties integrating the high resolution 
electrical equipment into the Phoenix Project EGSE.  Low resolution electrical measurements 
were performed.  The successful completion of these tests (auditory and low resolution 
electrical) on all four motors integrated into the RA is relied on to accept the motors for flight. 
Additional effort to X-ray the motors to obtain an indication of the brush condition was made, 
but proved unsuccessful due to the housing assembly shielding the brushes from adequate 
observation.  Fine-focus X-ray on the motors and brushes intended for flight was performed, but 
the density of the brushes is too low to be discerned after penetrating the housing.  Furthermore, 
when looking at the brushed in “plane view” (from the end), the motor metallic elements 
prevented any viewing of the brush.  Since all avenues to use X-ray failed on the MER Project, 
X-rays for the Phoenix Project motors prior to integrating the motors into the RA were not 
performed. 
6.3 Risk Assessment 
The following risk assessment was generated by the IRT.  The Phoenix Project risk assessment 
was conducted using a different methodology FC/CA that does not map directly to the 5x5 risk 
chart shown in Figure 6.3-1.  No 5x5 risk assessment on this subject was conducted by the 
Phoenix Project at the time of this report date.  However, an attempt was made by the IRT to 
correlate the identified risks for Hazard Event A to the risk matrix.  The following chart provides 
an explanation of the combined IRT and Phoenix Project risk assessments.  It was the consensus 
of the team that the best way to illustrate the Phoenix Project risk was to break it into two parts 
or two separate failure modes.  The first is a brush root break where a failure would be noticed 
shortly after occurrence in functional testing.  The second is a tip break which would be much 
more difficult to identify, but would also have a lower consequence for the mission. 
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Figure 6.3-1.   5 x 5 NESC Risk Assessment
The conclusion that a complete brush failure has a consequence rating of 5 most likely can be 
applied to 1 of the 4 RA motors and therefore drives the overall risk rating.  As indicated by the 
Project Systems Engineer, for most, but not all mission objectives, a single motor loss of any but 
one particular joint in the RA would not result in a complete mission failure (meeting minimum 
mission criteria).   
The initial assessment Likelihood of 2.5 is based on the NESC definition, “ Likely to occur some 
time in the life of the item.  Likelihood of occurrence is estimated to be between 0.001 and 0.01 
(10-3 and 10-2) per operational opportunity” in addition to an interpretation of the JPL FC/CA 
descriptions.  Table 6.3-1 illustrates the various parameters which contributed to this assessment 
and the underlying rationale. 
CONSEQUENCE
54321
1
C2
A  B3
4
5L
I
K
E
L
I
H
O
O
D
NESC RISK MATRIX
HAZARDOUS EVENTS 
A
B - Brush Root Break (Post Assessment)
C - Brush Tip Break (Post Assessment)
A – Initial Assessment
B
C
* The initial risk assessment performed by the Phoenix project was conducted using the JPL 
FC/CA methodology and does not correlate exactly to this 5x5 matrix.
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Table 6.3-1.   Risk Likelihood Assessment Rationale 
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The risk events were broken into two parts, a root break and a tip break.  As discussed in more 
detail within this report, a brush failure at the pivot (root break) is catastrophic to the motor, but 
there is a high likelihood that it will be detected through motor functional and system level 
testing.
A tip break is less likely to be detected during functional testing; however, a tip failure can still 
allow motor function but with a possible reduction in torque margin and/or life.  There is some 
concern that a tip failure is an indication of brush strength on the low end of the data scatter; 
however, the strength of the weakest brush tested is still greater than 3x the predicted worst case 
qualification loads.  Because of the motor functionality with a tip failure, the consequence is 
listed as a 4. 
The implementation of additional risk mitigation actions (additional testing and/or inspection), or 
following the recommendations stated within this report, could reduce the likelihood estimation, 
but would not produce any change to the consequence.  Only a change to the brush design or 
alternate motor would change the consequence estimation. 
The Phoenix Project Failure Assessment Matrix is provided in Appendix C.  The initial risk 
assessment conducted by the Phoenix Project utilized the following: 
Failure Effect Rating “3”; Major Degradation or Total Loss of Function
Failure Cause/Corrective Action Rating Currently “4”; Unknown Cause, Uncertainty in 
Corrective Action
JPL Problem/Failure Report (PFR) Risk Ratings: 
Two number system, the first number being "Failure Effect (FE) Rating" and the second being 
"Failure Cause/Corrective Action (FC/CA) Rating". 
Failure Effect Rating 1: Negligible 
        - Negligible degradation of required functional capability of Payload or spacecraft. 
        - Negligible degradation of engineering or science telemetry. 
        - Negligible increase in operational difficulties or constraints. 
        - Negligible reduction in lifetime. 
        - Support, test, or facility equipment problem/failure. 
        - Support, test, of facility operator induced problem/failure. 
        - Workmanship failure found at first scheduled test opportunity. 
        - Problem/failure could not occur in flight. 
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Failure Effect Rating 2: Significant 
        - Significant degradation or functional capability of Payload or spacecraft. 
        - Significant degradation of engineering or science telemetry. 
        - Significant increase in operational difficulties or constraints. 
        - Appreciable reduction in lifetime. 
Failure Effect Rating 3: Major degradation or total loss or functional capability of Payload 
or spacecraft.
The Cause/Corrective Action Rating is an assessment of the certainty that the exact failure cause 
has been determined and the corrective action will eliminate any known possibility of recurrence 
of the problem/failure in flight.  The numeric rating shall be 1, 2, 3, or 4 based on the following 
criteria:
Rating 1: Known Cause/Certainty in corrective action.  No known possibility of recurrence.
Analysis, corrective action, and verification of correction are considered to have determined the 
cause and have defined an effective corrective action that has been implemented and verified by 
test or other demonstration.  The effectiveness of the corrective action is certain; therefore, there 
is no residual flight risk. 
Rating 2: Unknown Cause/Certainty in corrective action.  No known possibility of 
recurrence.  The cause could not be completely determined, but an effective corrective action 
has been implemented and verified by test or other demonstration, or the problem/failure 
(observed incident) could not be repeated in tests or checkouts.  The effectiveness of the 
corrective action is certain and, therefore, there is no residual flight risk. 
Rating 3: Known Cause/Uncertainty in corrective action.  Some possibility of recurrence.
Analysis, corrective action, and verification of correction are considered to have determined the 
cause, but effective corrective action has not been implemented and verified by test or other 
demonstration.  The absolute effectiveness of the corrective action is uncertain; therefore, there 
is some residual flight risk. 
Rating 4: Unknown Cause/Uncertainty in corrective action.  Some possibility of recurrence.
The cause could not be completely determined and no effective corrective action has been 
implemented and verified by test or other demonstration.  The absolute effectiveness of the 
corrective action is uncertain; therefore, there is some residual flight risk. 
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7.0 Data Analysis 
An investigation of the analyses and screening tests conducted by the Phoenix Project during the 
design and build phase of these DC motors was conducted by the NESC IRT.  It was concluded 
that screening tests (electrical and auditory) conducted were the best possible with the available 
equipment.  However, additional non-invasive, nondestructive evaluations could be done to 
increase the confidence of the brush integrity.  It was suggested by the IRT that one potential 
nondestructive evaluation technique, N-ray examination may resolve the condition of the brushes 
inside the motor.  Therefore, an N-ray evaluation was performed on two non-flight motors to 
evaluate the potential of this technique.
In addition, examination of the environmental stability and material lot acceptance of brush 
material was also examined.  
7.1 N-Ray Test Summary 
An investigation was conducted by the IRT to show how effective N-ray would be for 
examination of the brush motor design.  Two motors were evaluated, as shown in Figures 7.0-1 
and 7.0-2. 
Figure 7.0-1 (Image 6304) depicts the interior of a partial motor assembly (missing the encoder 
assembly).  The brushes were intentionally installed incorrectly by not spring-preloading against 
the commutator.  If N-ray could not detect this workmanship flaw, then it was doubtful N-ray 
would be beneficial as a rigorous nondestructive tool.
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Report
Document #: 
RP-07-13
Version: 
1.0
Title:
Independent Review Support for Phoenix Mars Mission 
Robotic Arm Brush Motor Failure
Page #: 
22 of 54
NESC Request No. 06-050-E 
Figure 7.0-1.  Image 6304 Motor N-Ray Image (Brushes Intentionally Not in Position) 
Figure 7.0-2 (Image 6305) depicts a scan of a fully assembled motor with the encoder assembly 
included.
Figure 7.0-2.  Image 6305 Motor N-Ray Image 
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These inspections were performed by the McClellan Nuclear Radiation Center at University of 
California (UC)-Davis.  "Conventional" N-ray imaging, where the motor is placed on film (as the 
detector) and irradiated by an N-ray source, was of limited value.  The brushes were detectable in 
the side view, but not from the end view where their full shape and the loss of any macroscopic 
pieces could be observed.  The imaging is state-of-the-art in that they are produced by an N-ray 
equivalent to Computed Tomography (CT) scanning.  It took nearly a full day to produce each of 
the two images.   
As Figures 7.0-1 and 7.0-2 shows, the graphite brushes are distinctive in both scans.  When the 
images were magnified and slowly stepped through the sequential scans, some variation in the 
"density" of the brush was observed.  This density variation however, is an artifact of the scan-
and-reconstruction process.  The use of N-ray beyond the detection of macroscopic breaks in the 
brushes would require an involved development effort to determine if flaws or pre-existing 
cracks could be detected. 
Therefore, the following can be concluded from this test: 
1. N-ray imaging can distinguish the copper/graphite brushes within an assembled motor. 
2. Gross workmanship errors and, potentially, macroscopic brush breakage can be detected 
by N-ray scan imaging without destructive disassembly of the motor. 
3. N-ray scans should be able to detect a brush "tip break", or the brush "pivot break not 
displaced from the pivot". 
4. N-ray should be able to penetrate any metallic overshield or housings around an 
integrated motor.  However, it is currently not known whether Kapton™1 tape overwrap 
or Kapton™ film heaters around a motor, integrated at the next level of assembly, would 
interfere with the imaging. 
7.2 Environmental Stability of Molybdenum Disulfide (MoS2)
The copper/graphite motor brushes used for Phoenix Project contain MoS2 and were stored in the 
FHLP in an uncontrolled environment.  The chemical conversion of MoS2 is documented in open 
literature and facilitated by time and exposure to heat and humidity.  This chemical conversion of 
MoS2 would result in a higher coefficient of friction. 
1A registered owner of DuPont De Nemours and Company Corporation, Delaware 
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In general, MoS2 is sensitive to humidity at, or above, 40 percent RH.  The sensitivity increases 
when high humidity is combined with heating.  In humid environments, MoS2 can be converted 
to molybdenum oxide and hydrogen sulfide.   Molybdenum oxide has a high coefficient of 
friction than MoS2.  Hydrogen sulfide is acidic and potentially can have negative consequences 
to metal surfaces.  Again, this behavior is more of an issue under humidified conditions 
exceeding 40 percent RH and at higher temperatures.  This conversion is slow, but with 
significant exposure times, the entire MoS2 layer can be converted. 
On the positive side, the molybdenum oxide layer can usually be removed during normal 
operation via wearing through the higher friction layer and eventually arriving at the MoS2 layer. 
There was inspection of the brushes for composition, but only at the fractured surface and not at 
the original exposed surface of the brushes where conversion of the moly would have been 
evident.  Also, EDS may or may not have detected the oxide layer depending upon its thickness 
due to the sub-surface penetration of the EDS. 
7.3 Brush Material Lot Acceptance 
The motors and all brushes were manufactured for the MER Project in early 2001.  All brush 
components tested for strength were from the same lot of brushes that went into the motors.  The 
strength test report is included in Appendix D.   Table 7.3-1 provides a breakdown distribution of 
the motors built for MER and Phoenix. 
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Table 7.3-1.  RE020 Motor Usage and Residual Stock 
RE020 Motor Usage Quantity Balance Comments 
Total Motors delivered to JPL --- 211  
Number of motors rejected for 
various reasons (Motor Yield for 
Flight Use) 
43 168 43 motors deemed non-flt due to 
mfg or test anomaly (NOT broken 
brushes)
MER Flight Hardware 50 118 25 motors for each system 
Earth Test Bed Rover 17 101  
Phoenix Flight RA 4 97  
Phoenix EM RA 4 93  
Recent Motor Screening for Brush 
Breakage from FHLP Flight Stock 
8 85 Destructively Evaluated 
Motors used for various 
qualification tests, engineering 
evaluations, pyro shock testing, 
and destructive evaluations. 
71 14 Residual balance is spare flight 
quality motors in FHLP. 
The first two series of brush strength tests were performed for the MER Project in December 
2003.  The next three series of brush tests were performed for the Phoenix Project in  2006 (see 
Appendix D).  There were no obvious differences in the strength of the brushes between the first 
series of tests for the MER Project (which investigated temperature effects) and the Phoenix 
Project series (which added vacuum bake-out and thermal cycling). 
7.4 Brush Design 
It appears that a brush break resulting from increased friction at the interface was deemed not 
possible because it is stated that this would only occur with metal brushes.  This failure mode 
was observed in a different design brush motor used in an earlier project.   The brush design was 
a cantilevered metal leaf with a platinum-silver brush.  Unlubricated, insufficient life was 
exhibited.  When lubricated with Braycote®2 grease, life was acceptable but, under cold 
2 A registered owner of the Castrol Industrial North America Inc. Corporation Delaware
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operation, one brush would fail in bucking because the adhesion of the brush to the commutator 
was greater than the buckling strength of the cantilevered beam. 
All of the Phoenix Project motors are designed for bi-directional operation.  Both brush bodies 
are in shear/tension in one direction of rotation and in shear/compression in the other direction of 
rotation (assuming non-zero sliding friction). The hooked “arm” of both brushes depicted in 
Figure 7.4-1 is bending at the “elbow” in either direction of rotation. 
Figure 7.4-1.   Brush Motor Armature/Commutator Design 
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8.0 Findings, Observations, and Recommendations  
8.1 Findings 
F-1. Specific handling procedures were not available to ensure minimum risk to impact 
damage to flight hardware. 
F-2. Fine-focus X-ray inspection is ineffective in resolving brush degradation. 
F-3. N-ray inspection can resolve macroscopic brush damage, but requires development to 
determine if cracking or other microscopic flaws can be reliably detected. 
F-4. The storage of the motors in an uncontrolled environment has potential to chemically 
convert the MoS2 in the copper/graphite brushes causing an increase in the coefficient of 
friction.
F-5. One material lot with acceptable strength and thermal stability characteristics was used 
for the brush components used for all motors in the MER and Phoenix Projects. 
F-6. The bi-directional motor operation places complex reverse loading on the brush design 
which requires proper friction interaction with the commutator to minimize failure. 
F-7. The final RA motor functional and “listening” test will occur post system environmental 
testing, but prior to shipment to KSC.  Post shipment testing at KSC will include an 
"Aliveness Test" only where the motors will be briefly powered in the stowed position to 
verify continuity, and slight encoder motion. 
8.2 Observations 
O-1. The Phoenix Project performed a detailed investigation into the motor brush anomalies.  
However, there was no apparent attempt to investigate an alternate plan that would 
implement a different motor or brush design.  Although a system redesign and 
recertification would have been laborious, it may have provided an overall lower 
(likelihood and consequence) risk to the Phoenix Project.
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Report
Document #: 
RP-07-13
Version: 
1.0
Title:
Independent Review Support for Phoenix Mars Mission 
Robotic Arm Brush Motor Failure
Page #: 
28 of 54
NESC Request No. 06-050-E 
8.3 Recommendations 
R-1. To reduce the risk for a LOM due to undetected motor brush degradation, the Phoenix 
Project should conduct a nondestructive inspection such as N-ray for evaluation of the 
RA DC motors as late in the assembly level as practical.  However, once the RA has 
reached system level testing on the vehicle, removal of the motors for inspection is not 
recommended due to the potential for damage from the additional transportation and 
handling.  (F-1 and F-3)
- If inspection occurs on motors separated from the RA, then specific handling 
instructions should be generated to minimize risk to any additional damage. 
R-2. For transportation to KSC, apply monitoring accelerometers as near as possible to the 
RA.  Evaluate shock acceleration levels exceeding 75 g’s to determine the loading at the 
RA motors.  (F-7)
- Per JPL IOM 3550-DN-0647, “Load Equivalents on RE020 Motor Brushes,” peak 
accelerations in excess of 75 g’s axial are necessary before relative brush movement 
within the motor occurs.  This is felt to be a safe limit for protecting the brushes. 
9.0 Alternate Viewpoints 
No alternative or dissenting opinions were identified in the submission of this report. 
10.0 Other Deliverables 
No deliverables were identified in the submission of this report. 
11.0 Lessons Learned 
LL-1. Brush motors are problematic and should be avoided where possible for space missions.  
As stated in the NASA Space Mechanisms Handbook (NASA/TP-1999-206988): “The 
most common material for brushes is graphite, but graphite brushes are generally 
unsatisfactory for under vacuum conditions.  The water vapor present in air bonds to the 
ʌ electrons in the graphite, decreasing bonding between the hexagonal layers, allowing 
them to slide easily over each other, and thus providing lubricating properties normally 
associated with graphite.  In a vacuum there is no water vapor to tie up these bonds, the 
layers do not slide, and the graphite tends to powderize.”
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Also, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)-S-114 (Moving 
Mechanical Assemblies for Space and Launch Vehicles) states: “Direct current brush 
motors may require special design and brush selection to avoid arcing or debris 
generation in both partial and high vacuum, as well as during ground testing.” 
It is understood that operation in the Martian environment does not constitute a hard 
vacuum and the lubrication issues will be less severe; however, the lubrication and 
material strength issues associated with this design for earth ground operation and 
mission performance results in higher program risk than other alternative designs. 
LL-2. N-ray imaging is a good inspection technique when X-ray does not provide the 
appropriate penetrating image.  Neutrons are attenuated by matter either by scattering 
from the nucleus of a target atom or through absorption by that nucleus. Elements that are 
close together in atomic number will have similar X-ray attenuation and yet may have 
markedly different neutron attenuation characteristics that can be detected through 
neutron radiography. This makes possible a suite of inspections that can not be done with 
other radiographic techniques such as imaging light elements inside heavier elements, 
i.e., wax inside lead or hydrogenous materials inside metal. 
12.0 Definition of Terms  
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices, 
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools, 
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing, 
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.  
Finding A conclusion based on facts established during the assessment/inspection 
by the investigating authority.
Lessons Learned Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may 
be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap 
or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has real or assumed 
impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically correct; 
and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision 
that reduces or limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a 
positive result.  
Observation A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the 
assessment/inspection that did not contribute to the problem, but if left 
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uncorrected has the potential to cause a mishap, injury, or increase the 
severity should a mishap occur.  
Problem The subject of the technical assessment/inspection. 
Proximate Cause The event(s) that occurred, including any condition(s) that existed 
immediately before the undesired outcome, directly resulted in its 
occurrence and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome. 
Recommendation An action identified by the assessment team to correct a root cause or 
deficiency identified during the investigation.  The recommendations may 
be used by the responsible Center/Program/Project/Organization in the 
preparation of a corrective action plan.
Requirement An action developed by the assessment/inspection team to correct the 
cause or a deficiency identified during the investigation. The requirements 
will be used in the preparation of the corrective action plan.  
 Root Cause One of multiple factors (events, conditions, or organizational factors) that 
contributed to or created the proximate cause and subsequent undesired 
outcome and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome.  Typically, multiple root causes contribute to an 
undesired outcome. 
13.0 Acronyms List  
AC  Air Conditioner 
AIAA  American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
CT   Computed Tomography  
DC  Direct Current 
DPA  Deflection Plate Analyzer 
EGSE   Electrical Ground Support Equipment  
EM  Engineering Model 
EMRA  Electron Microscope Autoradiography 
FC/CA  Failure Cause/Corrective Action  
FE  Failure Effect 
FHLP   Flight Hardware Logistics Program  
FM   Flight Model 
GFE   Government-Furnished Equipment  
GRC  Glenn Research Center 
GSFC  Goddard Space Flight Center 
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HGAG  High-Gain-Antenna Gimbal
IRT  Independent Review Team 
JPL  Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
JSC  Johnson Space Center 
LaRC  Langley Research Center 
LOM  Loss of Mission 
MER  Mars Exploration Rover 
mm  Millimeter 
MoS2 Molybdenum Disulfide 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NDE   Non-Destructive Evaluation   
NESC   NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
N-Ray  Neutron radiography 
NRB  NESC Review Board 
PFR   Problem/Failure Report 
RA  Robotic Arm 
S/N  Serial/Number 
SRS   Shock Response Spectra  
TDT   Technical Discipline Team  
Volume II:  Appendices
A. NESC Request Form (NESC-FM-03-002) 
B. Rotor Photographs 
C. Phoenix Project Failure Assessment Matrix 
D. Motor Brush Strength Test Results 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Report
Document #: 
RP-07-13
Version: 
1.0
Title:
Independent Review Support for Phoenix Mars Mission 
Robotic Arm Brush Motor Failure
Page #: 
32 of 54
NESC Request No. 06-050-E 
Appendix A.  ITA/I Request Form (NESC-PR-003-FM-01) 
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Appendix B.  Rotor Photographs 
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Appendix C.  Phoenix Project Failure Assessment Matrix 
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Appendix D.  Motor Brush Strength Test Results 
JET PROPULSION LABORATORY INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM 
 3536-MK-06021 
 8/24/2006 
To: D. Sevilla 
From: Mike Knopp 
Subject: RE020 Brush Strength Analysis 
Reference: IOM 352H-DL-02-114, Summary of Testing of MER Motor Brushes 
Summary
Samples of RE20 Motor Brushes were inspected using a SEM and mechanically tested after thermal 
conditioning.  The data obtained from the mechanical testing was statistically analyzed to determine 
a probability of failure for a given load.  The predicted flight loads for the brushes are under the 
minimum predicted breaking strength. 
Sample Testing 
Samples of RE020 Motor Brushes from the same lots used for the flight build were mechanically 
tested in bending to determine their breaking strength.  Prior to testing, the brushes were subjected 
to a simulated Planetary Protection Bakeout and thermal cycling to represent environmental 
conditions flight motors were exposed to.  The thermal conditioning was performed on two separate 
batches of brushes, randomly selected from the flight lot.  The first batch contained 12 brushes and 
the second contained 8 brushes. 
The parameters for the bakeout and thermal cycling are given in Table I. 
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Table I: Thermal Conditioning Parameters 
Temperature, 
°C
Duration Pressure (torr) Notes 
Simulated Planetary 
Protection Bakeout 115 50 hours <10-3 
Thermal Cycling 
-80 to 110 
Ramp rate not 
to exceed ± 5 
°C/ minute 
10 cycles <10-3
Brushes were 
placed in a bag, 
purged with dry 
nitrogen, and 
sealed after the 
P.P. bakeout 
and again after 
thermal cycling 
The first batch of twelve brushes were visually inspected at 10x  prior to thermal conditioning and 
again inspected at high magnification using a SEM after mechanical testing.  The second batch was 
inspected using a SEM prior to thermal conditioning, after thermal conditioning, and after 
mechanical testing.  Two of the brushes in the second batch were damaged while attempting to 
remove them from the SEM stage prior to mechanical testing.  Due to this damage, only six brushes 
from batch two were mechanically tested.  No anomalies were identified during the inspection.  A 
detailed report on the inspections is provided in memo 3536-SD-06022, Microscopic Examination 
of Phoenix Actuator Motor Brushes, prepared by Saverio D’Agostino. 
The results from the testing of the RE020 Motor Brushes are given in Table II. 
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Table II: Mechanical Testing Results 
Batch 1 Phoenix Testing Batch Two Phoenix Testing
4/15/2006 6/23/2006
10 thermal cycles, -80 to 110°C, <10^-3 torr 10 thermal cycles, -80 to 110°C, <10^-3 torr
Sample Number Breaking Load, lbs Sample Number Breaking Load, lbs
1 0.196 1 3.0495
2 2.3585 2 3.9015
3 2.715 3 NA
Brush was 
damaged during 
removal from 
SEM stage
4 2.251 4 4.2605
5 1.7185 5 2.6855
6 1.7455 6 2.51
7 1.836 7 NA
Brush was 
damaged during 
removal from 
SEM stage
8 2.1555 8 2.9565
9 1.9655
10 2.1725
11 1.8845
12 1.7895
Max 2.715 Max 4.2605
Min 0.196 Min 2.51
Average 1.90 Average 3.23
Std Dev 0.612 Std Dev 0.698
Brush Condition: Simulated PP 
bakeout (50 hrs @ 115°C, 10^-3 
torr)
Brush Condition: Simulated PP 
bakeout (50 hrs @ 115°C, 10^-3 
torr)
Statistical Analysis
After the completion of mechanical testing, a statistical analysis was performed on the data.  Figure 
1 show the results of a three parameter Weibull data fit.   
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Figure 1. Three Parameter Weibull with Outlier 
As shown on the plot, the data fit, defined by the pve%, is 0.190 which is not acceptable for 
analysis.  The software package used to perform the statistical analysis (Weibull 4.0) indicated that 
sample number 1 of batch 1, the brush that failed at a load of 0.196 pound, was an outlier and 
should be discarded from the data set. 
The data was reevaluated after omitting the indicated outlier.  The data fit is shown in Figure 2, 
which in this case, had a  pve% of 99.9. 
(Note: Other statistical methods were tried including a two parameter Weibull with and without the 
“outlier.”  In all cases, the three parameter Weibull provided the best “fit” by a large margin.)  
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Figure 2. Three Parameter Weibull without Outlier 
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Once the proper data fit was established (three parameter), the analysis software was used to 
establish a probability of survival, Ps, based on the following equation: 
E
K
)( 0
FF
s eP


 
F: Applied load, lbs 
Fo: Threshold fracture load (shown as t0 is above plots) 
Ș: Characteristic load 
ȕ: Weibull Modulus 
Inputting values for Fo, Ș, and ȕ, generated by the analysis software using both Rank Regression 
and Likelihood Ratio methods of into the above equation yielded the following results shown in 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Probability of Survival 
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In the above plot, the vertical line indicates the maximum expected load a RE020 Brush will be 
subjected to. 
Conclusion
A shown, the predicted load at which failure of a brush will occur is much greater than any expected 
load the brush will see.  Further information pertaining to expected loads can be found in IOM 
3550-DN-0647, Load Equivalents on RE020 Motor Brushes. 
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Appendix E.  Load Equivalents on RE020 Motor Brushes 
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                               INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory    Aug. 24, 2006
California Institute of Technology                                               IOM 3550-DN-0647 
TO: D. Sevilla 
FROM: D. Noon  
SUBJECT: Load Equivalents on RE020 Motor Brushes
Executive Summary
With the exception of pyroshock, all environmental loads would produce negligible loads on the 
motor brushes.  Even the “outlier” weak motor brush in our strength testing program would have a 
quasi-static capability of 945 g’s, comfortably above the 5.5 g rms random acceptance test and 58 g 
landing loads qualification value. 
Calculations indicate that peak accelerations in excess of 200 g’s radial or 75 g’s axial are necessary 
before relative brush movement within the motor occurs.  Once this threshold of movement is 
exceeded, there is the possibility of internal impact events, with potential peak loads well in excess 
of the external excitation… similar in nature to pyroshock.  It is not possible presently to estimate 
these impact load peaks, or to relate such loads to the likelihood of failure. 
Introduction
The strength testing performed on motor brushes used a loading method that was simple and 
repeatable.  We would like to relate these strength values to loading events that are actually applied 
to the motor, i.e. vibe testing, landing loads, and pyroshock. 
One critical parameter is brush mass, which is 0.094 grams.  We can multiply brush mass by the 
acceleration to get the force acting on the brush, or vice versa. 
There are two directions of loading that must be examined:  
1. Radial (relative to motor axis) – tends to force the brush into or away from the commutator 
2. Axial – creates a cantilevered load on the brush pivot pin 
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Radial Loading
This is the loading which corresponds most closely to the motor brush strength tests.  While there 
may be some discrepancy in the applied test load location and the equivalent dynamic-induced load 
(acts at the brush CG), it is felt that it is accurate enough for these calculations. 
Spring Preload 
The motor brush is held in contact with the commutator by means of a torsion spring.  Previous 
calculations for MER estimated that ~200 g’s acceleration would be necessary to cause loss of 
contact.  Alternatively, we can say that the spring preload is a constant 200 X .094 = 18.8 grams 
force, or .041 lbf. 
Random Vibe 
Three levels were applied to MER motors 
1. Protoflight (32 motors):  used only on the first group, before the qual test had been 
performed.  9.2g rms, 60 seconds per axis.  9.2 g = .002 lbf rms.  Note:  this group of motors 
has been designated non-flight, due to an internal solder joint (Rev A) which was 
subsequently redesigned. 
2. Qualification (4 motors):  4 motors, 7.8 g rms, 120 seconds per axis.  7.8 g = .0016 lbf rms. 
3. Acceptance (158 motors):  5.5 g rms, 60 seconds per axis.  5.5 g = .00114 lbf rms. 
Landing Loads 
Only two groups of motors were subjected to the 58 g peak landing loads (sine burst) environment.  
Neither group is considered flight:  “Rev A” motors, and qualification motors (32 + 4 = 36 total 
motors).
58 g peak = 0.12 lbf peak 
Pyroshock
Normally one uses “SRS” curves when dealing with pyroshock; however, it is the peak 
accelerations that define brush response.  In any case, peak levels are normally well above 200 g’s 
for pyroshock events. 
If the acceleration peak from pyroshock is in a direction forcing the brush toward the commutator, 
the acceleration will add to the spring preload in a straightforward manner. 
If the pyroshock acceleration is away from the commutator, the brush will lift off of the 
commutator, impacting back upon the commutator at some later time.  Some effort had been 
expended on modeling the RE25 motor brush dynamics to try to estimate the impact speed and 
stresses, but there was no convergence of the modeling effort with the actual pyroshock failures (or 
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non-failure).  The RE020 has not been modeled in detail.  The related calculations that we DO have:
if the brush is deflected 45 degrees (slightly greater than the case geometry would allow) and let go, 
it will impact the commutator at approximately 4.8 meters per second.  This test has been 
performed, with no brush breakage. 
Drop Test 
One motor was dropped from increasing heights onto a linoleum-covered concrete slab floor.  At a 
drop height of 2 feet, a motor brush broke.  Note: it was difficult to get a perfectly flat landing, 
which would impart maximum impact.  Estimating the actual acceleration from this event is not 
possible.
Tabulated summary 
Radial g's lb force
Spring Preload 200 0.041
Spring preload + Qual random 207.8 0.043
Spring preload + qual landing loads 258 0.053
Weakest brush found 945 0.196
Second weakest brush 5166 1.070
Graphical
Load vs. Capability - Radial
(Not including pyroshock)
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 5500
Acceleration (g's)
Second-weakest brush tested
Weakest brush tested
Spring preload + qual landing loads (peak)
Spring preload + qual random (rms)
Spring preload
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Axial Loading
For accelerations in the axial direction, two sources of restraint come into play: 
1. Friction of the motor brush against the commutator 
2. Pivot restraint, in a cantilevered bending mode 
Friction
Estimated acceleration required for slippage = 65 g’s 
Pivot Restraint 
Once friction restraint is overcome, there is a zone of free-play where the clearance is taken up 
between the pin and the hole in the brush.  Wiggling the brush, it appears that this play (as measured 
at the commutator) is about ±0.5 mm.  There would be some impact loading, impossible to estimate. 
Testing of motor brush strength in the axial direction has been minimal.  In development testing, 3 
flight brushes were exposed to an axial force at a distance of 4.3 mm from the pivot pin 
(approximately the position of the motor shaft).  Breaking strength ranged between 225 and 370 
grams force (2.2 – 3.6 N), or 2394 – 3936 g’s equivalent acceleration.  Similar tests were performed 
by Maxon on 4 brushes, with reported breaking strengths between 7.2 and 9.7 N, equivalent to 7816 
– 10530 g’s acceleration.  It is not known why there is such a large difference between the 
measurements at JPL and the measurements at Maxon. 
Tabulated summary 
Axial g's lb force
Qual random 7.8 0.002
Qual landing loads 58 0.012
Friction 75 0.016
Minimum measured strength 2394 0.496
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Graphical
Load vs. Capability - Axial
(Not including pyroshock)
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Acceleration (g's)
Weakest brush tested
Friction
Qual landing Loads (peak)
Qual random (rms)
Summary
With the exception of pyroshock and other impact loads, the brush strengths measured are well in 
excess of any environmental loads imposed.   
Pyroshock normally is quantified in terms of SRS, an RMS energy spectrum which assumes a Q=10 
response in the article under test. It is not clear that this adequately measures the damage potential 
to the brushes.  Conceptually, it is the peak (or peaks) of acceleration that are important.  If a peak 
exceeds the quasi-static capability of the brush, there may be immediate damage.  If a peak exceeds 
the spring preload (200 g’s) or friction force (75 g’s), relative movements within the motor could 
lead to damaging impacts.   
The pyroshock and impact loadings appear to be the most likely source of damage potential, but 
these loads and their relationship to brush failure have thus far been irreconcilable by analysis. 
Cc: Arakaki, Bonitz, Burke, Reed, Shiraishi 
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The Phoenix Project requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) perform an independent peer review of the
Robotic Arm (RA) Direct Current (DC) motor brush anomalies that originated during the Mars Exploration Rover (MER) Project
and recurred during the Phoenix Project. The request was to evaluate the Phoenix Project investigation efforts and provide an
independent risk assessment. This includes a recommendation for additional work and assessment of the flight worthiness of the
RA DC motors. Based on the investigation and findings contained within this report, the IRT concurs with the risk assessment
Failure Cause / Corrective Action (FC/CA) by the project, “Failure Effect Rating “3”; Major Degradation or Total Loss of
Function, Failure Cause/Corrective Action Rating Currently “4”; Unknown Cause, Uncertainty in Corrective Action.”
NESC, Robotic Arm (RA), Mars Exploration Rover (MER), Phoenix Project, Direct Current (DC), Motor brush, Shock response
spectra (SRS), Motor health checks, Neutron radiography (N-ray), Electrical Ground Support Equipment (EGSE)
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